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NB:This paper is an abridged and revised version of an earlier document prepared for the Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)/
Institute for International Economics (IIE) seminar on sovereign debt restructuring, held in Paris on March 9, 2003.
1 See IMFC (2000).
The experience of sovereign debt crises in the 1980s and the 1990s has shown that the resolution of
crises involved co-operative efforts in which all parties concerned actively participated. With the
globalisation of economies, the sophistication of financial techniques, the generalisation of marketable
debt instruments and the large diversification of various classes of creditors, an appropriate reshuffling
of the overall debt crisis framework appears increasingly necessary.
In addition to the strengthening of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) crisis management
procedures (e.g. enhancing limits to IMF financing), the international debate has first focused on
two approaches for facilitating debt restructuring: the so-called “contractual approach” – based on the
generalised inclusion of Collective Action Clauses (CAC) in bond contracts – and the “statutory
approach”,  i.e. the proposal of a legal international sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM).
While important progress has been achieved in promoting CACs, including their incorporation in
recent bond issues of major emerging market countries, the 2003 IMF Spring Meetings concluded
that it was not feasible at this stage to move forward to establish the SDRM, while recognising that
work should continue on issues that are of general relevance to the orderly resolution of crises.
Against this background, the international community and the private sector have expressed interest
in developing a non-statutory framework for addressing debt-servicing problems, based on a proposal
of a voluntary “Code of Good Conduct” put forward by Governor Trichet. This Code would lay
down general principles to be complied with by all stakeholders, provide creditors and debtors with
a « roadmap » of the debt renegotiation process and a “tool kit” consisting of a range of instruments
(primarily CAC), and procedures regarded by the international community as best practices. The
G7 officials are expected to prepare a report on the Code, in consultation with issuers and the private
sector by autumn 2003.
S
ince the adoption of the “Prague framework” by
the International Monetary and Financial
Committee (IMFC) 1 in September 2000, the
international official community has pursued and
intensified its efforts to strengthen crisis prevention
and resolution. In particular, ensuring greater private
sector involvement has been at the centre of
international discussions for several years. Recently
the focus has increasingly been on addressing
sovereign debt restructuring and identifying ways of
making it more orderly.Banque de France • FSR • June 2003 155
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More generally preventing excessive public debt
accumulation has become a major concern of the
international community as ill-conceived public
policies have been clearly identified as a major cause
of recent financial distress in emerging economies.
2 Through a combination of IMF program, World Bank support and in some cases bilateral credit lines.
The rationale for a Code is examined in section 1,
its main features are dealt with in section 2; and the
prerequisites for its effective implementation are
addressed in section 3.
1| The raison d’être of a Code of Good Conduct
Recent experience has demonstrated that the risks of
sovereign debt crises should not be overlooked.
Sixteen months after defaulting on its external debt,
Argentina has embarked on the largest debt
restructuring ever; Uruguay has recently swapped
USD 5.3 billion of bonds for new securities with a
view to restoring medium term debt sustainability.
While in the 1980s sovereign debt crises used to
involve mostly bank loans rescheduling, recent
episodes have increasingly entailed the re-negotiation
of sovereign bonds, reflecting the evolution in the
external financing of emerging economies.
So far, experience with sovereign bond restructuring
suggests that collective action problems (i.e. the
difficulty of identifying bondholders, co-ordinating
meetings with creditors and reaching an agreement
supported by a large majority of creditors) have not
been as severe as many had feared. However,
restructuring agreements have sometimes been
difficult to achieve.
In some cases, the inability of an IMF program to
restore market confidence and/or  the unwillingness
of the official sector to envisage bailing-out 2 may lead
a country to seek a partial or comprehensive debt
restructuring consistent with the restoration of debt
sustainability. The international community has
therefore an obvious interest in adopting procedures
that will ensure an optimal restructuring process, in
order to minimise the cost of adjustment for the debtor
and its creditors and also to prevent contagion at the
regional or systemic level.
In view of its prominent role in crisis resolution
and given the multiplication of exceptionally large
programs, the IMF has recently amended its
internal process – procedures and access limits –
for providing official support in crisis situation.
The lack of a clear and predictable framework for
crisis resolution has been perceived as increasing
the risk of difficult and protracted negotiations,
against the background of subdued capital flows to
emerging markets. Although in most cases the156 Banque de France • FSR • June 2003
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Box 1
Collective Action Clauses: Recent developments
In September 2002, the G10 working group on CAC, chaired by R. Quarles (US Treasury), made recommendations
to Ministers and Governors on the design of CAC. These recommendations are aimed at achieving three goals 1:
Foster early dialogue, co-ordination and communication between parties, through:
– a bondholder representative, acting as an interlocutor with the sovereign during the life of the bond;
– a mechanism for the election of a special bondholder representative. This  representative should be empowered
to engage in restructuring discussions with the sovereign without undue delay;
– information sharing.
Provide for effective means for parties to re-contract, without a minority of debtholders obstructing
the process:
– a supermajority (typically 75%) of bondholders should be empowered to amend payments terms. The basis for
the calculation of such majority could vary according to applicable law and market practices;
– bonds directly or indirectly owned or controlled by the sovereign issuer and its public sector should be
disenfranchised;
– a supermajority (typically 75%) of bondholders should be empowered to accept an exchange of the bonds for
new instruments.
Ensure that disruptive legal action by individual creditors does not hamper a workout that is underway:
– a minimum of 25% of bondholders should be needed to accelerate repayments and another majority (with a
maximum of  2/3 of votes) should allow to de-accelerate;
– the power to initiate litigation should be granted to the bondholder representative and individual enforcement
should be explicitly prohibited;
– proceeds, recovered by any bondholder, should be distributed pro rata.
Following G10 recommendations, Mexico successfully issued, in February 2003, bonds with CAC under
New York law without incurring a significant penalty premium, thereby signalling that there might be room for
wider use of such clauses by sovereign issuers. Since, Brazil, South Africa, Uruguay and Korea have followed up.
In addition, European Union member-states indicated that, as of June 2003, CAC will be included in central
government bonds issued under foreign jurisdiction.
1 The Report of the Group was published in March 2003.
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2| The main features of a Code of Good Conduct
Basically, a Code seeks to clarify and improve the
debt re-negotiation process and provide elements on
the interaction with the official sector, i.e. the
international financial institutions (IFIs).
A Code should first lay down general principles
Building on earlier work 6, six main principles have
been identified as core elements of the Code :
– early and regular dialogue, based on trust among
debtors and creditors. In order to reduce market
overshooting following the debtor’s decision to
open negotiations about a restructuring, it is
expected that a close and ongoing dialogue with
its creditors, together with the provision of
comprehensive and accurate information, will
allow an early detection of debt servicing
difficulties. It will also help to achieve broad creditor
participation in restructuring deals at a later stage;
– transparency of information: interested parties
should ensure that fair information-sharing
mechanisms are in place. Participants should be
in a position to make an informed assessment of
3 IMF (2002).
4 See Krueger (2001).
5 See IMFC (2003).
6 See notably Council on Foreign Relations (1999).
interest of private creditors is to enter into
negotiations with sovereign debtors to protect their
assets, creditors might delay negotiations for several
reasons  3. First, the heterogeneity of the
creditors’ group could result in co-ordination
difficulties, complicating the task of assembling a
representative group. Second, not all creditors have
necessarily an interest in maintaining long-term
and/or commercial relationships with the debtor.
Until recently, the international debate has focused
on two possible approaches for facilitating debt
restructuring: the so-called  “contractual approach” 
— based on the generalised inclusion of Collective
Action Clauses (CAC) in bond contracts (see box 1) –
and the  “statutory approach” — i.e. the IMF proposal
of a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism
(SDRM)  4. Not only are these two approaches different
from a legal viewpoint, but they also differ with regard
to their nature: first, CAC are inserted in contracts
ex ante with a view to facilitating the restructuring
process of sovereign bonds; second, the SDRM would
provide a comprehensive framework to deal ex post
with sovereign debt problems, which relies on various
statutory  instruments (e.g. aggregation of claims,
targeted stay on litigation, Dispute Resolution Forum).
The IMF initiative has served to promote a better
understanding of the issues to be addressed in dealing
with the resolution of debt crises. However, the IMFC
stated that it is not feasible now to move forward to
establish the SDRM, while recognising that work
should continue on issues that are of general
relevance to the orderly resolution of crisis 5.
Against this background, the international
community has expressed interest in developing a
non-statutory framework for addressing debt-servicing
problems, based on a proposal of a “Code of Good
Conduct” put forward by Governor Trichet.
The key benefit of a Code of Good Conduct would be
to provide a comprehensive non-statutory framework to
address debt-servicing problems while preserving,
as far as possible, contractual agreements. Indeed,
a Code would spell out what is expected from all
parties in times of sovereign financial distress and
thus would provide a pragmatic way for stakeholders
to optimise their behaviour. This framework would
provide common principles while ensuring the
flexibility required for their implementation.  In
addition, a Code of Good Conduct is intended to
incorporate, or refer to various instruments and  “best
practices”. For example, the widespread inclusion of
CAC in debt contracts would facilitate the
implementation of the Code, although the Code could
be useful, in principle, in the absence of CAC
(e.g. where not all bond contracts include CAC
and/or other forms of debt have to be dealt with).
A Code would list agreed-upon best practices on
operational matters. By providing various options, it
would ensure that creditors and debtors can adapt to
the  “logic of circumstances”.158 Banque de France • FSR • June 2003
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the economic and financial situation of the
country, in particular to concur with the debtor
on the unsustainability of the sovereign debt;
– fair representation of creditors: once the debt
re-negotiation process has been initiated, a fair
representation of creditors will be key to agreeing
on the terms of a restructuring;
– comparable treatment of the different creditors: once
a debt re-negotiation process has been initiated,
specific procedures should ensure comparable
treatment among creditors. This principle is
essential since creditors will be reluctant to
participate in a non-statutory cooperative process
unless they are confident that free riders will not be
rewarded. At the same time, there is a difficult
balance to strike between an uncompromising
implementation of the principle of comparability of
treatment and the need to foster a deal agreeable to
a majority of creditors, which requires some
flexibility (see Paris Club experience). In the same
vein, the financing of critical activities (e.g. trade
financing) might call for the exclusion of some
categories of claims from the renegotiation process;
– economic and financial conditionality of debt
rescheduling: an efficient re-negotiation process
should primarily aim to enhance or restore, as
soon as possible, a country’s debt sustainability
over the medium term. By committing themselves
to working out a long lasting solution, the creditors
would accept the principle that an agreement that
does not restore debt sustainability is not viable
and therefore that the net present value of their
asset cannot be guaranteed;
– preservation, re-setting and strengthening of normal
financial relations between creditors and debtors.
In particular, participants in the negotiations should
commit themselves to negotiating in good faith.
While seeking a solution that restores debt
sustainability, the debtor should strive to minimise
the cost incurred by creditors and to enforce contracts
as long as possible. Similarly, creditors should
recognise that debt restructuring might require a
write-off of their claims.
A Code should also provide a “road map”
giving clear guidance to creditors and debtors
The “road map” should make it possible to
determine the different phases of diagnosis and
re-negotiation, under various crisis scenarios (see
box 2). It should also spell out the role to be
played by each party involved: debtor countries,
private creditors (banks, bondholders and others)
and official creditors. The key role of international
financial institutions, in particular that of the IMF,
in the different phases of re-negotiation should
also be specified.
A Code would seek to protect contractual rights to
the greatest extent possible. For the debtor, this
would facilitate market re-access after the crisis.
For creditors, the reference to the Code is expected
to reduce uncertainty about the restructuring
process without increasing debtor moral hazard.
Through ownership and appropriate incentives, it
should facilitate co-ordination among creditors, the
debtor and the official sectors so as to maximise
the likelihood of success. Given the informal
nature of the Code, concerted agreement on
standstills or stays will not legally bind rogue
creditors. Yet, by establishing internationally
recognised practices, a Code could reduce creditors’
incentives to hold out by raising the reputational
risk of not acting cooperatively.
A Code should provide a  “tool box”
As the above principles can be implemented in a
variety of ways depending on circumstances, a Code
should provide a whole range of internationally
agreed instruments and “best practices”.
Structures for dialogue
Regular dialogue during re-negotiation could take
place within “ad hoc steering committees” or within
standing bodies (e.g. the Paris Club). Different
options could be envisaged and tailored to the  needs
of the negotiation process.
Template for information sharing
First, the debtor would be expected to provide
creditors with information on the circumstances that
call for the re-negotiation of its debts, on the
outstanding stock of debts and on the negotiation
process (timeframe, treatment of claims not
included in the negotiation, etc.). Second, adequate
safeguards should be in place to protect confidential
information and to ensure equal level of information
for all parties. Creditors could appoint experts to
help them form their judgement.Banque de France • FSR • June 2003 159
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Modalities for representation of creditors
As each class of creditors faces specific constraints,
flexible approaches, inspired by recent experiences
and various fora, should be favoured. Contractual
provisions (CAC, especially majority clauses) should
be activated where they exist. Where absent, they
should be seen as a benchmark for the resolution of
issues such as, first, the appropriate level of
representation, second, the mandate given to
creditors’ representatives, and third, the majority
required to endorse key decisions. On the latter issue,
the solution suggested  by the G10 Report on CAC 7
could be considered as benchmark.
Concerted standstills
In some cases, a concerted standstill (i.e. an
agreement between a debtor and its creditors
providing for a suspension of debt payments, possibly
backed by a voluntary stay on litigation) is advisable
to prevent creditors from holding out. Specific
guidelines could be designed to form market best
practices. In some extreme circumstances, it might
be appropriate for the sovereign to resort to a
unilateral standstill; guidelines should clarify the
conditions under which it would be acceptable for
the debtor to go this route.
Guidelines for defining the scope of the debt
to be dealt with
Where Paris Club debt is substantial, there may be a
presumption that official creditors would participate
in the burden-sharing process, on a case by case basis,
in a manner which is consistent with its own
assessment of comparability of treatment.
Modalities of restructuring
In exceptional circumstances, creditors might be
compelled to accept a reduction in the net present
value of their claims consistent with the restoration
of medium term sustainability. In practice,
experience of both the Paris Club and restructuring
of private claims suggest that a variety of technical
solutions could be tailored to debtors’ situations and
creditors’ concerns.
Box 2
Stylised scenarios for the implementation of a Code of Good Conduct
As debt situations faced by countries are diverse and evolve rapidly, a Code should be designed to deal with a
broad range of situations that can be illustrated by three scenarios :
In a first scenario (“alleviating short-term tensions on medium-term sustainable debt”) characterised by sustainable
debt over the medium-term, a country faces short-term financial pressures and there are increasing expectations that
the situation could deteriorate further. In order to prevent an unsustainable debt dynamic from developing, pro-active
debt management or debt re-negotiation might be examined by the debtor. In this context, creditors and debtors could
usefully implement several principles of a Code.
In a second scenario (“re-negotiating unsustainable debts, while remaining current”) characterised by
unsustainable debt, the debtor triggers a debt re-negotiation process, while still being able to service debt payments.
An IMF program aimed at restoring debt sustainability over the medium term is designed. The principles and best
practices of a Code are expected to provide a  comprehensive framework which would allow debtors and creditors to
renegotiate new terms and conditions expeditiously, before the situation of the debtor deteriorates further.
In a third scenario (“renegotiating unsustainable debt under a payment standstill”) characterised by
unsustainable debt and a temporary payment standstill, the Code would aim to reduce the risk of a
non cooperative debt-restructuring process. Its implementation aims to ensure the debtor’s good faith and fair
burden sharing among participants. The combination of an IMF adjustment program and lending into arrears
is to be used as a critical instrument to reduce the severity of the crisis and ensure fair implementation of the
Code, including the good faith criterion.
7 It would be up to the creditors to choose between a qualified majority (typically 75%) with provisions to set up quorum rules, and the
so-called outstanding principal approach (with a reasonable threshold of 75%).160 Banque de France • FSR • June 2003
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Mediator
A third party could be appointed as a mediator to
prevent mutual suspicion. A fresh pair of eyes
could help identify points of divergence between
the debtor and creditors and help to reach a
consensus.
3|1 The conditions
The pre-conditions for an effective resolution of
debt-servicing problems and, hence the
implementation of a Code, are twofold.
Early identification of debt unsustainability
IMF surveillance should help the debtor and creditors
to determine the appropriate timing for activating the
Code. In particular debt sustainability assessments,
which are to be routinely undertaken by the IMF, will
play a crucial role in the activation. They will allow
the debtor and its creditors to identify situations where
debt re-negotiation might be required.
Appropriate IMF conditionality
An IMF program is likely to be designed in
conjunction with the implementation of a Code. This
program will provide parties involved in the
re-negotiation process with two  “public goods”:
information (e.g. macroeconomic situation, financing
gap, optimal debt structure), and leverage to ensure
that the sovereign’s economic policy is consistent
with restoring debt sustainability.
A strong incentive structure is necessary to ensure an
effective implementation of the Code.
3|2 The incentives
Enhanced discipline in IMF financial assistance
The Code could not work properly unless the
conditions for accessing IMF resources are clearly
spelled out. Indeed, without clear and firm access
3| The conditions and incentives
to make a Code of Good Conduct successful
limits, the expectations of IMF financing will
postpone the necessary actions.
Support and ownership from all stakeholders
The Code needs to be agreed upon and endorsed by
all parties involved in debt re-negotiations. Ownership,
which is a common feature of other codes and
standards, is seen as one of the main incentives for
adhering to and then implementing the Code.
Therefore, the Code should be jointly drafted by
representatives of the three constituencies involved:
the private sector, the emerging countries and the
official sector. It also has a bearing on its endorsement,
which needs to be achieved by representative groups
from the three constituencies involved.
Market incentives
The experience of international standards and codes
points to the effectiveness of an approach that relies
on internationally agreed-upon principles and best
practices. The same positive results can reasonably
be expected with a Code as peer and market pressures
should contribute to deterring stakeholders from
departing from its recommendations.
– On the debtor’s side, emerging economies’ willingness
to avoid an increase of investors’ risk aversion
vis-à-vis  all emerging markets will result in pressure
among these countries. In addition, market
expectations that the debtor will act according to the
rules agreed upon should reinforce market discipline;
indeed, a non co-operative attitude, on the part of
the debtor, would be rapidly censured by markets as
it would be seen as a deliberate breach of best
practices. The market reaction would entail higher
costs for the debtor resulting from sharper economic
adjustment than would otherwise be necessary
New money
To stabilise capital flows and preserve market access,
a cut-off date could be set, resulting in the exclusion
of new money from the re-negotiation process. The
experience of the Paris Club might be useful to
determining best practices.Banque de France • FSR • June 2003 161
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together with a long-term loss of market access.
Conversely, a co-operative process would greatly
facilitate the return of the debtor to the market
after the crisis is over.
– On the creditors’ side, there is interest in
maintaining the contractual relationship with
the debtor as long as possible to increase the
recovery value of claims. In addition, following
the Code would reduce uncertainty about the
restructuring process without increasing debtor
moral hazard. Finally, co-operative procedures
and non-binding principles would rein-in
creditors’ incentives to engage in litigation.
There is widespread recognition that the current framework for dealing with sovereign debt crisis
needs some improvement. In other words, the status quo is not an acceptable option. Both the
international official community and the private sector seem to agree on the merits of a  non-statutory
approach to addressing sovereign crises. That said, there are differences in opinion on the objectives
and modalities of this approach.
At the present juncture, a  “Code of Good Conduct” seems to offer a promising avenue.
The international official community has expressed interest in assessing further the potential benefits
of this approach. The G7 officials are expected to prepare a report on the Code, in consultation with
issuers and the private sector, by autumn 2003.
The inclusion of CACs by Mexico, Brazil and possibly by other issuers in the foreseeable future,
points to growing awareness of the benefits expected from the adoption of contractual provisions
aimed at tackling debt crisis resolution. This important step will make it easier to move towards the
adoption and implementation of a Code of Good Conduct.162 Banque de France • FSR • June 2003
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